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Abstract. In the present paper we show that a computational model of affective 
moral decision making can fit human behavior data obtained from an empirical 
study on criminal decision making. By applying parameter tuning techniques on 
data from an initial sample, optimal fits of the affective moral decision making 
model were found supporting the influences of honesty/humility, perceived risk 
and negative state affect on criminal choice. Using the parameter settings from 
the initial sample, we were able to predict criminal choices of participants in the 
holdout sample. The prediction errors of the full model were fairly low. 
Moreover, they compared favorably to the prediction errors produced by 
constrained variants of the model where either the moral, rational or affective 
influences or a combination of these had been removed.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Ratio and Affect in Criminal Decision Making 
Although there is substantial evidence that emotions are fundamental inputs in the 
criminal decision making process  [1], references to the role of emotions have largely 
remained confined to narrative or interpretative approaches and rarely made it into 
choice models of offending. These approaches are limited in terms of gaining insight 
into the decision making process, as they do not specify the psychological 
mechanisms according to which they operate [18] or how emotions influence the 
criminal calculus and alter concerns regarding risk.  
The possible interplay between cognition and affect has been prominent in dual-
process theories of information processing [5]. Van Gelder [18] argues that criminal 
decision making processes, perceived as a particular kind of risk taking, may also be 
insightfully portrayed as invoking these two types of processing. According to the 
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hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making, the cognitive, ‘cool’, processing 
mode is sensitive to risk considerations and is therefore likely to respond to notions of 
sanction severity and certainty, as suggested by deterrence theorists [18]. The 
cognitive mode is also responsible for balancing costs against benefits and making 
projections about the long-term consequences of decisions and, consequently, 
functions much in accordance with the logic assumed by rational choice theory. The 
affective mode, on the other hand, remains largely unresponsive to probabilities [21]. 
The dual-process approach applied to criminal decision making can illuminate why 
notions such as severity of punishment in general have little or no effect on crime 
rates, why the effect of punishment certainty is only modest, and why recidivism rates 
are as high as they are.  
The present study focuses on the relationship between personality, ratio, affect and 
criminal behavior. Our point of departure is the HEXACO model. Recently, 
reanalyses of the same lexical data that have yielded the Big Five model have 
suggested that instead of five, there are six main dimensions of personality. In the 
HEXACO model, a sixth cross-culturally corresponding personality dimension named 
Honesty–Humility is added [6]. This trait refers to individual differences in the 
tendency to be interpersonally genuine, to be unwilling to take advantage of others, to 
avoid fraud and corruption, to be uninterested in status and wealth, and to be modest 
and unassuming. Recent research by Van Gelder and De Vries [20] suggests that the 
HEXACO model and its Honesty-Humility dimension in particular, is also a strong 
predictor of criminal behavior.  
1.2 Predicting Criminal Behavior Using a Computational Model 
To be able to predict human criminal behavior, we created a computational model of 
affective moral decision making. To our knowledge, no agent models  that also 
include affect and personality to predict crime have so far been proposed. As a first 
step in this direction, we integrated a moral reasoning system that matched the 
decision of medical ethical experts [12] and an empirically validated model of 
affective decision making [7]. We extended the affective moral decision making 
module so that the agent can take into account anticipatory emotions during the 
decision making process. The section below will explain the model in more detail.  
We obtained empirical data to test whether the model can predict human criminal 
behavior. In simulation experiments, we optimized the weights for the moral, rational 
and affective influences in the decision making process and the morality of the 
criminal choice, based on the first half of the sample, using parameter tuning, similar 
to [2]. With the obtained  weights, we tested the predictions for the holdout sample 
(i.e., the remaining half of the participants) using seven different versions of the 
model: the full model and constrained versions of the model, in which one or two of 
the three influences in the decision making process (i.e., personality, ratio and affect) 
were removed. We hypothesized that the full model would fit the data the best. 
Because of the generic form of the model, we expect that if the model successfully 
predicts human affective moral decision making (i.e., criminal behavior), it can also 
be used to simulate human affective ethical decision making.  
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2 The Computational Model of Affective Moral Decision Making 
In the rational moral reasoning system [12], the agent tries to estimate the morality of 
actions by holding each action against the moral principles inserted in the system and 
picking actions that serve these moral goals best. The moral goals inserted into the 
system are (1) autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) non-maleficence and (4) justice. The 
agent calculates the estimated level of Morality of an action by taking the sum of the 
ambition levels of the moral goals multiplied with the beliefs that the particular 
actions facilitate the corresponding moral goals: 
 
Morality(Action) = ΣGoal( Belief(Action facilitates Goal)) * Ambition(Goal))     (1) 
 
This can be represented as a weighted association network, where moral goals are 
associated with the possible actions via the belief strengths that these actions facilitate 
the four moral goals.  
However, only focusing on balancing principles through rational argumentation 
may lead to the underexposure of the role of social processes of interpretation and 
communication [10]. To be able to capture these human moral decision making 
processes, we integrated the moral reasoning system of Pontier and Hoorn [12] with 
Silicon Coppélia [8], a computational model of emotional intelligence that is capable 
of affective decision making. During the process, the agent retrieves beliefs about 
actions that facilitate or inhibit the desired or undesired goal-states. This is to 
calculate an ExpectedUtility [0, 1] of each action. Actions that facilitate desired goals 
or inhibit undesired goals will have a high ExpectedUtility [8]. In an affective 
decision-making module, affective and rational influences are combined in the 
decision-making process. By combining moral reasoning and affective decision 
making into Moral Coppélia, human moral decision making processes could be 
simulated that could not be simulated using the moral reasoning system alone [15]. 
In the previous affective decision making module in Moral Coppélia, emotions 
were only implicitly regulated, by picking actions that lead to desired goals. To be 
able to account for Negative State Affect in Moral Coppélia, we added 
ExpectedEmotionalStateAffect (EESA) [0, 1] to the affective moral decision making 
module. Here, a high EESA indicates that an action is expected to improve the 
emotional state of the agent, whereas a low EESA indicates that an action is expected 
to worsen the emotional state. Hereby, we more explicitly add the emotion regulation 
strategy situation selection of Gross’ model of emotion regulation [4] to the system. 
For calculating the EESA, we added ActionEmotionBeliefs (AEB) [0, 1] to the 
system. An AEB(action, emotion) represents the belief that an action will lead to a 
certain level of emotion. For example, an AEB(shoplifting, excitement) of 0.6 
represents the belief that shoplifting will lead to a level of excitement of 0.6. The 
ExpectedEmotion (EE) [0, 1] is calculated using formula 2: 
 
EE(action, emotion) = (1−β) ∗ AEB(action, emotion) + β * current_emotion     (2) 
 
In this formula, the persistency factor β is the proportion of emotion that is taken into 
account to determine the EE. The new contribution to the emotion response level is 
determined by taking the appropriate AEB. 
To determine the EESA of an action, a weighed sum of the discrepancy between 
desired emotions and expected emotions after performing the action is subtracted 
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from 1. For simplification, the weights w(i) were set to the same level for all emotions 
added to the system: 
      EESA(action) = 1 - (  * (Desired(emotion(i)) – EE(action, i)))              (3) 
To determine the ExpectedSatisfaction [0, 1] of a criminal choice, a weighed sum is 
taken of the Morality, the rational ExpectedUtility and the emotional EESA of the 
action: 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(action) =        
wmor *  Morality(action) + 
wrat *  ExpectedUtility(action) +  
wemo *  ExpectedEmotionalStateAffect(action)        (4) 
3 Matching the Data to the Model 
153 undergraduate psychology and educational science students from a university in 
the Netherlands were approached by email to participate in a short scientific study 
about dilemmas. Two scenarios were used to measure the mediating and outcome 
variables. Both scenarios described illegal behavior that can be classified as common, 
minor crime, i.e., illegal downloading and insurance fraud. Both scenarios were 
followed by a set of items measuring anticipated sanction probability and severity, 
negative affect, and criminal choice. For more information about the scenarios and the 
procedure, see [20]. 
For matching the data to the model, we transformed all obtained data to the domain 
[0, 1]. Subsequently, we populated a virtual environment with agents that estimated 
the probability of making a criminal choice. Each agent was coupled to a participant. 
The goals inserted into the system were ‘profit from a criminal choice’ and ‘not 
getting caught’. The emotions inserted into the system were ‘hope’, ‘fear’, ‘joy’ and 
‘sadness’. For each agent, the rational beliefs about actions relating to goals were set 
to a level so that the ExpectedUtility of an action matched the Perceived Risk of the 
participant. Additionally, the beliefs about actions relating to emotions were set to a 
level that the EESA of the criminal choice matched the Negative State Affect. The 
weight of the morality in the decision-making process was set proportional to the 
level of the trait ‘Honesty-Humility’ in the participant. To divide the remaining 
weight for calculating the expected satisfaction of a criminal choice, the rational and 
emotional influence were each assigned a part of the remaining weight, where we 
made sure that partrat + partemo = 1. In formula 5 and 6, wrat_opt and wemo_opt represent 
the optimal weights found with parameter tuning for the rational and affective 
influences in the decision making process. 
 
wrat = (1-wmor) + partrat * wrat_opt        (5) wemo = (1-wmor) + partemo * wemo_opt      (6) 
 
With the found weights, we tested the predictions for the holdout sample (i.e., the 
remaining half of the participants) using seven different versions of the model: the full 
model and constrained versions of the model, in which one or two of the three 
influences in the decision making process (i.e., personality, ratio and affect) were 
removed.  
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The quality of fit was determined by investigating the discrepancy between the 
expected satisfaction of the agents (i.e., their prediction of the behavior of their 
human counterparts) and the likelihood of criminal choice as reported by the 
participants. The coefficient of determination R2 [17] was calculated to determine the 
quality of the fit (the closer to 1 the better). The match was called satisfactory when 
the quality of fit did not increase anymore for several time steps. If the matching 
process seemed to be stuck into a local optimum, the parameters were adjusted by 
intuition to check whether the match could be improved. 
4 Results 
Table 1 shows the results of the simulation experiments. In experiment 1, we tried to 
predict the criminal choice of the participants by agents using only the rational 
expected utility in the decision making process. This resulted in an R2 of 0.719 for the 
holdout sample. In experiment 2, only making use of the Expected Emotional State 
Affect (EESA) of a criminal choice resulted in an R2 of 0.906 for the holdout sample. 
In experiment 3, optimally tuning a combination of ratio and affect resulted in a partrat 
of 0.34 and a partemo of 0.66, leading to an R2 of 0.9323 for the holdout sample. In 
experiment 4, using only moral reasoning resulted in an R2 of 0.9281 for the holdout 
sample. In experiment 5, an optimally tuned combination of moral reasoning and ratio 
resulted in an R2 of 0.9803 for the holdout sample. In experiment 6, an optimally 
tuned combination of moral reasoning and affect resulted in an R2 of 0.9778 for the 
holdout sample. Experiments 5, 6 and 7 found similar values for the morality of the 
criminal choice (morcc). 
Table 1. Simulation results 
 Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 Exp 6 Exp 7 
morcc 0 0 0 0.68 0.42 0.453 0.435 
wmor 0 0 0 1.00*hh 0.96*hh 0.97*hh 0.87*hh 
partrat 1 0 0.34 0 1 0 0.64 
partemo 0 1 0.66 0 0 1 0.36 
R2 initial 0.7553 0.8792 0.9222 0.9336 0.9871 0.9798 0.9881 
R2 holdout 0.7192 0.9060 0.9323 0.9281 0.9803 0.9778 0.9821 
 
The optimal fit was found in experiment 7. Here, we tested the full model, including 
moral reasoning, ratio and affect in the decision-making process. Parameter tuning led 
to a partrat of 0.64 and a partemo of 0.36, resulting in an R2 of for the simulation of the 
0.9881. The R2 for the predictions of the holdout sample was 0.9821. 
5 Discussion 
We asked the participants to estimate the probability of making a criminal choice in 
two scenarios, and assessed their perceived risk and the negative state affect with 
respect to different criminal choices using a scenario design. Additionally, we 
measured the personality dimension Honesty-Humility of the participants.  
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We extended a model of affective moral decision making, Moral Coppélia [15], and 
matched the participants to agents equipped with the model. We applied parameter 
tuning techniques and found optimal parameter settings to fit the initial sample. Using 
the obtained parameter settings, we predicted the criminal choice of the participants in 
the holdout sample. The prediction errors that were found turned out to be fairly low. 
Thereby we have shown that an extended version of Moral Coppélia can fit empirical 
data. This can be seen as a form of ecological validation.  
Moreover, we compared the prediction errors with those produced by constrained 
variants of the model where either the moral, rational or affective influences or a 
combination of these had been removed. The best predictions were produced by the 
full model, which confirms our hypothesis.  
This is an important indication that making a criminal choice is dependent on the 
participants’ personality, rational choice considerations, as well as emotions. This 
corresponds with recent informal models of criminal decision making [18, 19, 20]. 
Thereby the current findings strengthen these informal models. We show that the 
models can be used to reproduce and predict human criminal decision making. 
There are many applications in which a combination of moral reasoning, rational 
choice considerations as well as emotions is useful. In the first place, the model can 
be used to predict criminal behavior in humans. Additionally, Moral Coppélia can be 
used to develop intelligent agents for a wide variety of applications, such as (serious) 
digital games, tutor and advice systems, or coach and therapist systems. Another 
possible use is in software and/or hardware that interacts with a human and tries to 
understand this human’s cognitive and emotional  states and processes and responds 
in an intelligent manner. The system can combine sensor data as input to project 
Moral Coppélia in the user to maintain their emotional state. This can enable the 
system to adapt the type of interaction to the user’s needs. 
Additionally, there are many applications in which agents should not behave 
ethically ‘perfect’ in a rationalist sense. They should be able to distinguish between 
right and wrong. In a training simulation or serious game, police officers may not 
always be effective when they ‘play it nicely.’ Sometimes they have to break the 
moral rules (e.g., lie or cheat) to achieve a higher goal (e.g., prevent a murder). The 
need to be context-sensitive and not rigidly follow rational principles is crucial in all 
human interaction.  
Furthermore, Moral Coppélia can be used to develop agents for interactive 
storytelling. A trend in developing virtual stories is the movement from stories with a 
fixed, pre-scripted storyline toward emergent narratives; i.e., stories in which only a 
number of characters and their personalities are fixed, rather than the precise script of 
the story. In emergent narratives, ideally, all the designer (or writer) has to do is to 
determine which (types of) characters will occur in the play, although usually it is still 
needed to roughly prescribe a course of events. To accomplish complex personalities 
with human-like properties such as emotions and theories of mind, researchers have 
started to incorporate cognitive models within agents (e.g., [3]). Moral Coppélia can 
be seen as a next step into this direction. The agent can combine moral reasoning with 
rationality and emotions to make decisions on its own. The agent can simulate 
emotions, and regulate them upwards as well as downwards using various emotion 
regulation strategies. 
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Agents telling stories are not only useful to make the elderly feel less lonely. 
Autonomous agents that can affectively make moral decision are also applicable in an 
entertainment context (e.g., computer games, see [13]). Additionally, the use of 
autonomous agents also proved to be useful for clinical experts in the treatment of 
behavior problems, family counseling, and training [11], education [16], or in 
persuasive contexts (e.g., science and health communication), or clinical therapy [9].  
In particular, agents can play a useful role in the interaction between human and 
computer in a Web context. One of the application areas foreseen is in self-help 
therapy, in which humans with psychological disorders are supported through 
applications available on the Internet and virtual communities of persons with similar 
problems. An agent equipped with Moral Coppélia can respond empathically toward 
the user. Together with expert knowledge, the agent can use the model to behave 
emotionally intelligent and give ‘the right response at the right moment’.  
As is, the moral reasoner with rational and affective components only allows 
choosing from given decision options in scenarios. In future research, we additionally 
want to explore what happens if the Caredroid makes use of computational creativity 
to propose alternatives that include more information than the offered decision 
options. Finally, we would like to extend autonomy in the moral reasoning system to 
be able to distinguish positive and negative autonomy [14] 
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